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Foreword
by Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider
The South Caucasus, and the broader Caspian region, is becoming increasingly 
more important for European energy, security and economic interests. Europe’s 
Southern energy corridor depends on Europe’s access to the energy resources in 
the Caspian Sea. Stability in the South Caucasus has a direct impact on security 
along the EU Black Sea flank, while EU-Russia, EU-US, and EU-Turkey relations 
are being shaped by and are shaping the trends in the broader Caspian region.
The changes in the region are overwhelming, and yet, the EU has not made the 
necessary adjustments. Part of  the problem has been the lack of  German focus 
in this region, which ironically has become increasingly interesting for the Ger-
man private sector, most notably Azerbaijan, which is the 6th major oil supplier to 
Germany today, and also the biggest recipient of  German FDI that flows into the 
South Caucasus.
Further, Azerbaijan through its balanced foreign policy and steady domestic devel-
opment has become the regional leader. It not only is the biggest economy in 
the South Caucasus region, but it has become a major energy supplier to Turkey, 
Georgia and Southern Europe. It is a connecting point for Europe to Turkmeni-
stan, and a key player in broadening regional security. Azerbaijan has the highest 
military budget in the region in nominal figures and over 20 percent of  its territory 
is under Armenia’s control. The Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict is an obstacle 
that stands in the way of  unhindered regional cooperation and integration, and is a 
security threat to European energy projects in the Caspian and to European invest-
ments in this region. For this reason, Germany should increase the political push 
within the EU to bring a lasting solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
This paper is a timely endeavor, with appropriate key messages for the German 
and European decision-makers. Not only is this an opportunity to engage in the 
region more proactively, but Berlin also has an inherent interest in recalibrating 
its regional policy to fit better the current regional realities. Germany has always 
had a special relationship with Russia, but as this paper argues, it thus should also 
take the unique responsibility and shape a value added and independent European 
policy towards the South Caucasus.
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Die Politik der Europäischen Union gegenüber dem Südkaukasus ist ein typisches 
Beispiel für das Unvermögen ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten, eine gemeinsame Politik 
gegenüber dem postsowjetischen Raum zu entwickeln. Gleichzeitig ist die EU nur 
relativ langsam dazu in der Lage, auf  Veränderungen in der Region zu reagieren. 
Dies betrifft insbesondere den Einfluss- und Bedeutungszuwachs von Aserbai-
dschan im Südkaukasus. Das Scheitern von Konfliktlösung im Südkaukasus hat 
auch seine Ursachen im begrenzten Engagement der EU in der Region und in 
den unterschiedlichen Interessen ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten, was die EU-Politik in 
der Region wenn überhaupt dann reaktiv macht. Erstens, der Südkaukasus ist 
Ausdruck für die interne Debatte in der EU, wie die Politik gegenüber Russland 
und dem Südkaukasus entwickelt werden soll. Zweitens, die zum Teil ideologisch 
geführte Diskussion über die Diversifikation der Energieversorgung in Europa hat 
die Debatte über die Erschließung und den Zugang zu den kaspischen Energieres-
sourcen ohne konkrete Erfolge beeinflusst. Drittens, die Region zeigt das Fehlen 
einer gemeinsamen »westlichen« Strategie, d.h. der EU und den USA, gegenüber 
dem postsowjetischen Raum.
Als Ergebnis war die europäische Konfliktlösung in der fragmentierten Region 
in den letzten 20 Jahren wenig erfolgreich. Gleichzeitig nutzte Russland, welches 
ebenfalls ohne Entwicklungsstrategie für die Region ist, die Abwesenheit der EU, 
um den Status quo zu erhalten und die Region in seinem Interesse zu beeinflussen. 
Die drei südkaukasischen Staaten sind deshalb frustriert mit der relativ schwachen 
und gegensätzlichen Politik der EU in der Region. Es war ein Fehler, die EU-
Politik im Südkaukasus auf  Georgien zu konzentrieren, insbesondere als deutlich 
wurde, dass die georgische Führung ihr Land nicht demokratisieren und eine natio-
nale Versöhnung suchen würde. 
Deshalb sollte die EU-Politik gegenüber dem Südkaukasus neuausgerichtet werden. 
Deutschland kann eine zentrale Rolle für die Neugestaltung der EU-Politik gegen-
über der Region spielen, ist jedoch im Moment ein wenig aktiver Akteur in der EU-
Ostpolitik-Debatte. Wenn Deutschland nicht dazu bereit ist, die Östliche Partner-
schaft der EU aktiver zu unterstützen, dann wird die EU insgesamt darin scheitern, 
zu einem relevanten Akteur im Südkaukasus und Kaspischen Raum zu werden. 
Fehlender Einfluss bedeutet begrenzten europäischen Zugang zu den kaspischen 
Ressourcen, dem zentralasiatischen Markt sowie das Scheitern der Demokratisie-
rungspolitik in der gesamten Region. Deutschland und die EU sollten das »window 
of  opportunity« nutzen, welches sich nach dem russisch-georgischen Krieg im 
August 2008 geöffnet hatte, um eine umfassende Strategie für den Südkaukasus zu 
entwickeln. 
DGAPanalyse 2 | July 2010

Recalibrating Germany’s and EU’s 
Policy in the South Caucasus
by Stefan Meister
The European Union’s policy towards the South Caucasus is a typical example 
of  the inability of  its member states to develop a common policy towards the 
post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the EU has been slow to adapt to changes in the 
region, such as, most notably, the rise in power and relevance of  Azerbaijan in the 
South Caucasus region. The failure of  conflict resolution in the South Caucasus 
is also due to diverging interests between the member states and EU’s limited 
engagement in its neighborhood, which makes the EU policy towards the South 
Caucasus at the most reactive. First, the South Caucasus fuels internal European 
disputes on how one should develop a policy towards Russia, and its post-Soviet 
neighbors. Second, an ideologically charged debate about diversification of  energy 
supply has unfolded in the Europe-Caspian discourse, without tangible results. 
Third, the region exemplifies a lack of  a common Western – that is US and EU 
strategy – towards the post-Soviet space.
As a result, conflict resolution in this fragmented region has not yielded results in 
the last 20 years, and Russia, lacking its own strategy for the development of  the 
region, uses the absence of  a serious EU involvement in conflict resolution to pro-
long the status quo and control over the region. The three South Caucasian states 
are highly frustrated with EU’s weak and contradictory policy in the region. From 
the beginning it was a mistake to concentrate EU’s regional approach on Georgia, 
especially when it became obvious that the Georgian leadership failed in trans-
forming the country’s strong western support into a clear political democratization, 
economic transformation, and national reconciliation.
There is an urgent need for recalibrating EU’s policy towards the South Cauca-
sus. Germany can play a crucial role in setting in motion a new policy approach 
towards the region, but it is currently a weak link in the EU’s eastern policy debate. 
If  Germany is unwilling to actively promote Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy 
the EU as a whole will fail to be a relevant player in the South Caucasus and the 
broader Caspian region. By default, a lack of  influence means limited European 
access to Caspian energy resources, and the broader Central Asia market and 
consequentially the failure of  democratization policy in the region. Germany has 
traditionally played a key role in all EU initiatives in the region, but has thus far 
been unable to consolidate its vision for the wider trans-Caspian region into a 
comprehensive strategy. The EU and specifically Germany should use the window 
of  opportunity that opened after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 to 
develop a comprehensive strategy concerning the South Caucasus
Summary
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Why the South Caucasus?
There are numerous reasons why the EU, and 
especially Germany, should recalibrate its activi-
ties in the South Caucasus. Capitalizing on its last 
enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, the EU 
has now become a direct actor in the Black Sea 
region, which borders the South Caucasus. Further-
more, the South Caucasus, in particular Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, form a land bridge to the energy 
resources of  the Caspian Sea and the gateway to 
Central Asia and China. The frozen conflicts that 
have for decades undermined regional progress and 
cooperation negatively impact broader European 
security. Weak borders, proliferation and traffick-
ing are soft security threats, which the EU can no 
longer ignore. 
At the same time, the instability in Afghanistan is 
directly impacting the stability of  the South Cauca-
sus political systems, and in this way influencing the 
security of  Europe. Conflict resolution is deeply 
connected with bringing comprehensive stability to 
the broader Caspian region and instigating future 
economic development in the three South Cauca-
sus countries, and can stimulate flow of  foreign 
investments into the region. Without a solid pres-
ence and position in the South Caucasus, Europe’s 
role in Central Asia will continue to be very limited 
– most recently this lack of  EU influence in the 
political process in Central Asia became apparent 
during the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, where the political 
management was reserved for Russia, Kazakhstan 
and to an extent the US. Furthermore Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the southern part of  
the Caucasus which cannot be separated from the 
North Caucasus as a part of  the Russian Federa-
tion. This makes Russia a key player in the South 
Caucasus because conflict solution and economic 
development must be seen within the context of  
developments in the Northern Caucasus.
The political trends in the region favor a new strat-
egy of  EU engagement. Not only has the balance 
of  power in the region shifted in favor of  Azer-
baijan, but also the politics of  enlargement and 
European integration have changed in the last few 
years, making the prospect of  EU membership 
for the South Caucasus countries unlikely. Energy 
and investments have become the primary drivers 
of  engagement between Europe and the broader 
Caspian region. Currently, Azerbaijan is Europe’s 
key energy partner in the South Caucasus, as well 
as Europe’s connection to the gas riches of  Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan.
Rather than focusing first and foremost on Georgia, 
the EU should work with all states and taken into 
consideration the various levels of  development, 
their different conflicts as well as different interests 
in the rapprochement with the EU. Furthermore 
the EU should foster a special relationship with 
Azerbaijan, which because of  geographic loca-
tion and economic potential has become the most 
important economic partner for Europe in the 
region. The Azerbaijanian record on human rights 
and democracy is a work in progress, but economic 
development and to some degree political stability 
are for the South Caucasus important outcomes of  
the current leadership’s policies. As membership in 
the EU is not really on offer for the South Cauca-
sus states, the EU’s ability to impact change in this 
region will come mainly from engagement in eco-
nomic and energy issues, as opposed to democracy 
and human rights policy. A state like Azerbaijan, 
which has a multi-vector foreign and energy policy, 
needs Europe’s strategic support in order to pro-
mote regional development, and enhance stability.
Azerbaijan is also Europe’s natural connection to 
Central Asia, and trade, energy and political links 
between Azerbaijan and east Caspian states are 
already established. Therefore, working with Azer-
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baijan to develop a comprehensive Central Asian 
policy, as well as emphasizing EU’s relations with 
Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus context, can yield 
a double win for Berlin and Brussels. By focus-
ing on relations with Azerbaijan, Europe could 
increase its relevance in both the South Caucasus 
and in Central Asia, as well as become a more 
competitive economic player within these markets, 
which cumulatively represent more than 100 mil-
lion consumers.
Frozen conflicts in the South 
Caucasus after the Russian-
Georgian War
The Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 and 
Russia’s unsupported recognition of  South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia have changed the geopolitical situa-
tion in the South Caucasus. Countries in the region 
are desperately searching for alternative allies and 
links in order to avoid a dependence on Russia. No 
serious external power, not even Belarus or China, 
has recognized the independence of  the two sepa-
ratist territories.1 This lack of  recognition weakens 
Russia’s position in the South Caucasus and in the 
post-Soviet space and challenges its alliance policy. 
Today Russia alone is responsible for the economic 
development and political stability of  South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. The track record in the North Cau-
casus shows that Russia has no strategy to pacify 
and develop ethnically tense regions. While Abkha-
zia has the potential to be independent from Russia, 
South Ossetia has become a de facto subject of  the 
Russian Federation. These developments are both 
unsustainable and contrary to the broader security 
and strategic interests of  the EU in the region.
The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which 
started in 2006 was accelerated by the August 2008 
war. For the Armenian decision-makers it became 
strikingly clear how isolated their country had 
become and how risky their dependence on Rus-
sia is. The Armenian leadership was thus keen to 
restart negotiations with Turkey. Turkey, urged by 
the US, and looking for greater regional influence, 
initially embraced the rapprochement policy, but 
has subsequently abandoned this policy.
For Azerbaijan the results of  the Georgian war are 
problematic in two ways: first, the recognition of  
South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence by 
Russia sets a dangerous precedent and could have 
a negative effect on the resolution of  the Nago-
rno-Karabakh frozen conflict. Second, the bulk of  
Azerbaijan’s energy exports pass through Georgia. 
The security of  this supply route was challenge by 
the war; a problem that also affects Turkey as it tries 
to define itself  as a reliable energy hub, delivering 
to the market gas and oil from the Caspian region 
and Russia. Thus, Turkey also has an underlying 
motivation to bring lasting stability to the region, 
which helps explain Ankara’s initiative to create a 
new platform for Stability and Development in the 
Caucasus. The Turkish initiative has been received 
with a degree of  skepticism by the countries in the 
region, while Baku has been especially critical of  
Ankara’s rapprochement with Armenia.
In fact, Azerbaijan has subsequently strengthened 
its energy cooperation with Russia, signing an 
agreement with Russia’s gas monopolist Gazprom 
for the sale of  500 million m3 of  gas in 2010 – this 
volume can be increased to 1 billion m3 by the end 
of  this year.2 Furthermore Baku will export 500 
million m3 of  gas to Iran in 2010 and Azerbaijanian 
officials are exploring possibilities to sell natural gas 
to China and India. For Turkey, Azerbaijan is not 
only an important political ally but also an indis-
pensable alternative supplier for oil and gas, which 
Turkey needs to balance out its overdependence on 
Russia. All in all, Azerbaijan and the Trans-Caspian 
connection are key components in Turkey’s strategy 
to become an energy hub.
Georgia has lost its reputation in the West: The 
majority of  the EU member states assess the cur-
rent Georgian leadership as unpredictable, and the 
Obama Administration is showing serious reser-
vations in backing Tbilisi unequivocally. During 
the course of  the war Georgia lost its rebellious 
regions, which has put an indefinite end to the 
policy of  re-integration. Tbilisi’s second important 
goal, a NATO-membership, is no longer on the 
table. Despite increased criticism of  the regime in 
Tbilisi, the West gave Georgia an unprecedented 
aid to deal with the economic consequences of  the 
war – $4.55 billion to meet its post-conflict needs.3 
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It is in nobody’s interest to further destabilizing 
Georgia, and offering Georgia aid right after the 
war key to help strengthen regional stability. But as 
long as the Georgian President leads his country 
without efficient checks and balances, Georgia will 
struggle to contribute effectively to conflict reso-
lution in the region. Neither the parliament, the 
constitutional court, the opposition, nor the public 
were able to control the executive to start a war 
after having been provoked by Russia.
After the August war, the negotiations over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict intensified. Russia 
launched a series of  high-level meetings, which 
culminated in a joint Russian-Armenian-Azerbai-
janian declaration on the non-use of  force signed 
by the Presidents of  the three states, Ilham Aliev, 
Serzh Sargsyan and Dmitri Medvedev on the 2 
November 2008. Yet, neither the Minsk group nor 
the Russian initiative has achieved a breakthrough 
in the Karabakh conflict. On the contrary, Baku 
has grown increasingly frustrated with the Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement and subsequent Arme-
nian refusal to agree to a full withdrawal from the 
occupied territories in Azerbaijan. More recently, 
the Armenian President suspended the ratification 
of  the protocols with Turkey, in light of  Turkish 
Premier Erdogan’s refusal to commit to the border 
opening between Turkey and Armenia as long as 
Armenian troops remain in Azerbaijan.
As a result of  the August war and the change in 
leadership in Washington, the US engagement in the 
region has decreased. Because the US Government 
is dealing with a difficult conflict in Afghanistan, and 
Iran’s nuclear challenge, the South Caucasus is falling 
in rank on the Washington’s priority list. At the same 
time the Obama administration is emphasizing good 
relations with Russia, which means it will strive to 
avoid conflict with Moscow in the post-Soviet space. 
However, it is unlikely and unreasonable for Wash-
ington to abandon the South Caucasus altogether, as 
this region is also the gateway to Central Asia and 
thus is important for securing the transit for the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to 
Afghanistan and access to energy resources.
Having been a bystander in the South Caucasus 
for almost two decades, the EU is assuming a 
more proactive and direct role in the region. After 
mediating a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia, 
Europe established a monitoring mission (EUMM) 
in Georgia. The EU has strengthened its pres-
ence in the region, which raises expectations in 
the South Caucasian states of  the future role of  
Brussels in the region. On the one hand, Russia 
has accepted the EU’s role in monitoring the situ-
ation. On the other hand, it expects the EU to 
recognize the current status quo of  South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. This is a challenge that the EU has 
to manage and which will determine the future of  
Europe’s role in that region. However, still missing 
is a long-term EU strategy for the region and the 
willingness to assume responsibility for conflict res-
olution and development in the South Caucasus.4
The Eastern partnership and the Southern Energy 
Corridor might be the tools necessary for increasing 
the ties between the EU and the South Caucasus 
countries, but they are no strategy. However the key 
challenge for a credible EU policy in the region is 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict, as 
the key conflict of  the South Caucasus. Nagorno-
Karabakh and the seven occupied regions surround-
ing it constitute close to 20 percent of  Azerbaijan’s 
territory. Armenian occupation of  these areas has 
persisted since a cease-fire was negotiated between 
the two sides in the early 1990s. This occupation goes 
against international law, and contradicts recognized 
norms and principles of  sovereignty, and its resolu-
tion should be the main focus of  the EU. Above 
all, the EU should be consistent in its approach to 
conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. If  in the 
case of  Georgia, Brussels clearly backs the principle 
of  territorial integrity of  the Georgian state, the same 
principle must apply in the case of  Azerbaijan.
Armenia’s occupation of  Azerbaijan not only is a 
major security challenge to regional integration and 
cooperation, but a serious economic impediment, 
which keeps the regional market artificially and 
unnecessarily fragmented. Resolving this conflict 
will do more to unlock Armenia’s isolation and 
integrate the South Caucasus market with Turkey, 
more than any other regional initiative. Hence, the 
focus of  German and EU’s policy in the region 
should be on conflict resolution and economic 
development rather than on given development aid.
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Balance of economic power in the 
region
The states in the south Caucasus differ greatly in 
status of  economic development. While Azerbai-
jan produces more than 60 percent of  its GDP 
through the export of  oil and gas, and therefore 
has a much higher GDP than Georgia and Arme-
nia, the economies of  the latter two depend pri-
marily on the construction sector, services and 
agriculture. The two have suffered more than Azer-
baijan in the latest economic downturn, but their 
economies are also less vulnerable to fluctuation in 
energy prices. The Armenian economy is heavily 
subsidized with money transfers from the Arme-
nian Diaspora. The amount of  money sent home 
by migrant workers in 2008 was more than $2.1 bil-
lion, which equaled more than half  of  the domestic 
retail turnover.5 Georgia on the other hand, earns 
a great deal on transit fees from energy and trade 
moving from the Caspian Region to Turkey and 
across the Black Sea to Europe, and on fees it col-
lects from trade passing between Armenia and Rus-
sia. Approximately 70 percent of  Armenian trade 
transits via Georgia.6 Because of  Armenia’s eco-
nomic and energy dependency from Russia and its 
transit dependency on Georgia, the recent conflicts 
between Russia and Georgia have hurt the Arme-
nian economy severely.
Azerbaijan is the main energy supplier for Georgia, 
as well as a key energy partner for Turkey. Today, 
the Azerbaijan oil and gas company SOCAR owns 
significant parts of  the Georgian gas distribution 
network.7 It supplies Turkey with close to 8 billion 
cubic meters of  gas per year, and it is a key partner 
in the US-backed BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline) project, designed to bring Caspian oil to 
the global market.
Despite the high potential for conflict the South 
Caucasus countries demonstrated impressive eco-
nomic growth and have made significant progress 
in reforms since the mid-2000’s. Economic growth 
combined with market reforms has stimulated 
European private sector interest in the region. 
Azerbaijan had one of  the highest real GDP 
growth rate worldwide (between 10 and 30 percent 
from 2002 to 2008), reaching 30.5 percent growth 
in real GDP in 2006. In spite of  the financial crisis 
Azerbaijan managed to retain a GDP growth of  9.3 
percent in 2009 and the IMF forecasts for 2010 is 
of  2.7 percent.8 From 2003 to 2008 Armenia and 
Georgia recorded a less impressive but compared 
to Europe still high GDP growth cycle; both man-
aged a growth rate close to 10 percent.9 But unlike 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and especially Armenia, were 
hit by the global economic downturn, and saw their 
economies shrink in the last few years. Thanks to 
the large financial injection of  international aid in 
2008, Georgia managed to offset somewhat the 
negative impact of  the global economic recession.
Georgia is a regional leader in economic reforms 
and market liberalization. After Mikhail Saakashvili 
became president in 2004 he started comprehen-
sive economic reforms which led to a high level of  
foreign direct investment and impressive economic 
growth. The government simplified the tax code, 
overhauled the custom code and is tackling corrup-
tion head-on. The number of  taxes applicable to 
the business sector was reduced from 21 to 7 and 
the government introduced a flat tax of  12 percent. 
The World Bank recognized Georgia as one of  the 
fastest reforming countries in the world in 2008. 
During the peak of  economic growth – between 
2006 and 2008 – foreign direct investment quarterly 
inflows into Georgia averaged half  a billion Dol-
lar.10 FDI has slowed since the war with Russia and 
due to the global financial crisis.
Azerbaijan’s creation of  a state oil fund (SOFAZ) 
contributes to making the country more credible 
as an economic and as a trade partner in spite of  
enduring problems with corruption, comparable 
to those in Armenia. Azerbaijan’s oil production 
is largely responsible for the high growth rates 
between 2005 and 2007 as the oil and gas sector 
accounted for 52.8 percent of  the GDP in 2007 
and even more than 50 percent in 2008.11 More 
than 40 percent of  state revenues will be provided 
by transfer from the SOFAZ in 2009.12 Azerbai-
jan made some efforts to modernize its economy, 
which means first of  all simplifying domestic regula-
tory requirements for investments and transparency.
However, some limitations remain across the 
region, most notable impediments to foreign direct 
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investment being inefficient administrations and 
corruption. Like in Armenia but in a contrast to 
Georgia, the state still plays a dominate role in the 
economy of  Azerbaijan. Armenia remains an iso-
lated economy, with no real access or potential to 
compete on external markets.
EU’s transport and energy projects 
in the South Caucasus
The South Caucasus touches a number of  Euro-
pean key energy routes, and is integrated in several 
Eastern policy initiatives including the European 
Neighborhood policy, the Eastern Partnership, and 
the European Black Sea Synergy. It is part of  the 
Southern Energy Corridor and the Trans-Caspian 
strategy. The Southern Corridor has become a 
priority energy project for Brussels, and is outlined 
in the Second Strategic Energy Review published 
in November 2008.13 The Review calls for a new 
degree of  energy interdependence, especially with 
Russia and the Caspian countries. After the Geor-
gian-Russian war in the summer of  2008 and the 
gas supply interruptions resulting from the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian crisis in January 2009 the Southern 
Energy Corridor and its key project, the Nabucco 
pipeline has become a priority in the European 
diversification debate.
The Southern Energy Corridor relies on two sup-
ply regions – the Caspian basin, where the key 
gas suppliers are Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
potentially Uzbekistan, and the Middle East, where 
the gas would be supplied from Iran and Iraq via 
Turkey to Europe. The estimated total volume of  
gas transiting through the Southern Corridor is 
between 30 and 40 billion cubic meters, and the 
infrastructure under consideration includes pipeline 
projects like the White Stream (Azerbaijan-Georgia-
Ukraine-EU), Nabucco, and Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnector.
Because of  its geographic location, established rela-
tions with western energy companies, and a final-
ized transit agreement with Turkey, Azerbaijan is 
Europe’s key partner for the Southern energy cor-
ridor.14 So far Azerbaijan has been the only Caspian 
country committed to fill in the Nabucco pipeline 
from the beginning of  the project, but this is not 
enough for the full capacity. Due to the exploration 
of  the second phase of  the major offshore Shah 
Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea Azerbaijan will 
be able to export up to 30 billion m3 in long run. 
The country is also a connector to Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan have a long-term potential (starting 
from 2020) for gas exports of  around 150 to 200 
billion m3, but it is still unclear, how to transport 
their gas trough the Caspian Sea.15 Turkmenistan 
sits on the third biggest global natural gas reserve 
and Europe’s access to Turkmen gas will only be 
possible with the help of  Azerbaijan.
Although the EU member states are the main poten-
tial consumers of  Caspian energy, and European 
energy companies like BP, ENI and Statoil play an 
important role in the extraction of  Caspian gas and 
oil, the EU has failed to politically back a key strate-
gic project connecting it to the region. As the princi-
pal energy consumer, Europe should prioritize Cas-
pian gas. First, Europe needs to ensure a transparent 
transit regime that satisfies both, Turkey’s interest in 
position and political weight of  being a hub-nation, 
and the interests of  the end-users of  the gas transit-
ing in continental Europe. At the same time, EU 
must keep in mind the long-term relevance of  the 
Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan Interconnector, in order to 
ensure access not only to Azerbaijanian’s, but also 
Turkmenistan’s gas. Direct access to Caspian gas 
resources is the only way for the EU to ensure that 
the Southern Energy Corridor contributes net value 
to European energy security.
The South Caucasus has also been thought as a 
transit route connecting EU trade with Central 
Asia, China, and India crossing the Black Sea, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. The goal 
of  this visionary TRACECA (Transport Corridor 
Europe Caucasus Asia signed in 1998)16 project was 
to develop integrated transport strategies and infra-
structure between Europe and the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia states, bypassing Moscow-centric 
routes from the Soviet times. A second project, 
INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to 
Europe) was also developed in the mid-90’s and 
was aimed at integrating oil and gas pipeline routes 
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between the region and Europe to increase the 
security of  supply. Both projects failed to fulfill 
their objectives and expectations, due to under-
funding and lack of  political support.
The lessons from these failures are applicable to 
the existing Southern energy corridor. First and 
foremost the EU needs to back major infrastruc-
ture projects between Europe and the Caspian 
region with high-level political support from the 
capitals. This support can attract the east Caspian 
states into the project, as well as overcome any 
attempts at revising the transit conditions agreed 
by Turkey. The member states support will pacify 
possible Russian objections and help Azerbaijan 
resolve its outstanding dispute with Armenia over 
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Germany as the advocate for an 
EU South Caucasus strategy
What the South Caucasus needs is a strong political 
advocate inside of  the European Union compa-
rable with France’s role in the Union of  the Medi-
terranean Sea. The EaP was important in focusing 
the EU on the Eastern Neighborhood, however 
the Polish-Swedish initiative lacks the active sup-
port of  countries that are key shapers of  EU’s 
eastern policy. Here, the role of  Germany, and an 
increased presence of  German political actors in 
the South Caucasus are critical. The division in the 
EU between countries that perceive Russia as a key 
partner for EU’s Eastern policy (Germany, Italy 
and France) and those, that see the big neighbor 
as the main obstacle (Baltic States, Poland, Swe-
den) is a main hindrance in developing a competi-
tive and functional EU policy towards the South 
Caucasus. A clear policy position from Germany 
can help overcome this division. Furthermore, the 
opportunity to forge a common EU policy towards 
the region is now more realistic, especially as both 
Poland and Sweden took on cooperative positions 
vis-à-vis Russia, and Moscow has done the same 
vis-à-vis Poland and the Baltic States.
Following the collapse of  the Soviet Union, the 
main focus of  German eastern policy has been its 
relations with Russia. The German “Russia first 
approach” can be explained in a historic-economic 
context, namely the Russian support for the Ger-
man unification, German economic and energy 
interests in Russia, and the German perception that 
security of  Europe is only possible in cooperation 
with Russia. Germany’s interest in Russia and its 
support for Eastern enlargement of  the EU became 
the key components of  EU’s eastern policy. Hence, 
Germany is not only critical to an invigorated EU 
South Caucasus policy, but also essential to its imple-
mentation. Without Berlin’s leadership, there can be 
no changes to the current EU position in the region 
because there will be no clear support from the EU 
member states on how to manage the Russia factor.
With changes in the post-Soviet space and with 
the accession of  the Central-Eastern European 
states to the EU Germany’s role as the main player 
on EU’s Eastern policy decreased. While the post-
Soviet countries diverge from Russia, Germany’s 
foreign policy still is focused first and foremost on 
Russia. Beside its special relationship with Moscow, 
the German leadership was not able to develop a 
two-track policy, which, on the one hand, involves 
Russia and on the other hand, establishes bilateral 
relations without Russia in the post-Soviet space. 
Moreover, Germany’s predominant interest in Rus-
sia hinders its initiatives towards Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus. The absence of  Russia was 
an important reason why the former Minister of  
Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier refused to 
introduce the important EaP initiative in the EU 
together with Poland.
Germany’s policy towards the 
South Caucasus and the wider 
Caspian region
In 2008 Germany’s trade volume with Azerbaijan 
reached €2.4 billion, €358 million with Georgia, 
and only €237 million with Armenia.17 For Ger-
many, Azerbaijan is clearly the main trading partner 
in the South Caucasus. It is increasingly relevant 
for Germany’s big industry and the energy sector. 
In 2008, Germany purchased 3.5 million tons of  
oil from Azerbaijan, making Azerbaijan the 6th 
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most important oil supplier for Germany. Since 
2001, a Caucasus initiative of  the Federal Minis-
try for Economic Cooperation and Development 
has increased efforts to improve the cooperation 
between the three states, to support the political 
and economic transformation of  the region and 
contribute to conflict resolution.18
In addition to Azerbaijan’s growing relevance for 
EU-member states as trade partner, Azerbaijan is 
also increasingly important to the EU and Ger-
many for energy security (access to primary energy 
resources in the Caspian Sea and access to gas in 
Central Asia). Furthermore, the South Caucasus is 
also relevant for global security (sharing a border 
with Russia and Iran), and transit security (Central 
Asia-China). In 2007, the German government 
introduced the Central Asia strategy and Black Sea 
Synergy during its EU Presidency. But the German 
government did not pursue a sustainable policy to 
foster the relations with Central Asia and the Black 
Sea/South Caucasus states in the long-term.
Within the European Union, Germany is a key 
player in policy regarding the South Caucasus, and 
has introduced important initiatives for this region. 
It was a German initiative to organize a fact-finding 
mission after the August war 2008. Furthermore 
Germany placed Hansjörg Haber as the head of  
the EUMM, and sends the highest number of  
members to the monitoring mission.19 Moreover, 
the appointment of  an EU special representative 
for the South Caucasus in July 2003 was based on 
a proposal by the German government. Media-
tion in the conflicts concerning South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, the concept of  a Caucasus Stability Pact, 
and the support of  integration of  the three states 
into the EU comprise Germany’s initiatives in the 
region in the past years. But they did not help to 
solve the conflicts in the region. Germany never 
took the initiative to bring the EU as a relevant 
player into the South Caucasus and Trans-Caspian 
region. Berlin’s consideration of  Russia’s interests 
in the region inhibited the German government 
to get more involved in conflict resolution and to 
push EU policy towards the region.
Related to the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ments with the three South Caucasian states in 
1999, there was, especially among the German 
political elite, a debate on the significance and risks 
in the South Caucasus. With regard to the Balkan 
Stability Pact, originally a German concept, a Sta-
bility Pact for the South Caucasus was discussed 
in 1999/2000. This concept included not only the 
South Caucasus but also the Caspian region and 
Central Asia. Beside the goal to prevent a crisis in 
the region and to contribute to a conflict solution, 
the main goal was to create a secure environment 
for European investment in the region. “European 
market interests demand political stability as a 
prerequisite.”20 This project never became reality 
because neither the EU-member states nor the 
states of  the region were ready for a comprehen-
sive initiative. The lack of  a regional will for coop-
eration and absence of  an EU consensus on the 
region in the EU hindered the implementation of  
this project. Now, the situation has changed; after 
the Russian-Georgian war the geopolitical situation 
in the region is different, and the EU seems to be 
more willing to act in the South Caucasus and Cas-
pian region.
Former German Minister of  Foreign Affairs Frank-
Walter Steinmeier traveled to Georgia, Abkhazia, 
and Russia in July 2008 to cool down the increas-
ing tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia and 
to distribute a peace plan.21 Steinmeier’s trip came 
too late and was not embedded in a functioning 
negotiation process; it could not prevent the war. 
All these important initiatives will always have just 
a limited success as long as they are not embed-
ded in a comprehensive strategic and much more 
focused EU-policy towards the entire region. After 
the Georgian-Russian war, the Green party as well 
as the leading coalition of  CDU/CSU (Christian 
Democrats) and SPD (Social Democrats) called 
on the German government to increase its direct 
involvement in the South Caucasus region. The 
governing coalition demanded a clear German con-
tribution to regional development and peace.22
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A new German approach towards 
the South Caucasus
Summary of  key points on how the German policy, 
and in turn the EU policy towards the South Cau-
casus should change:
1. Germany should act as an advocate for more 
European engagement in the South Caucasus 
and the Trans-Caspian region within the EU. It 
should use its authority, economic power, and 
conceptual spadework to advance a platform 
to promote broader Trans-Caspian cooperation. 
The South Caucasus is the bridge between the 
Black Sea and Central Asia; it is the connec-
tion for Europe to the Caspian resources. This 
approach should favor economic cooperation, 
the support of  good governance, and active work 
on conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. 
This multidimensional and multilateral approach 
could act as a counter model to unilateral and 
hegemonic interests in the region and can be a 
precondition for conflict resolution and cross-
border cooperation. Both Germany and the EU-
member states would gain a better framework for 
investment and economic cooperation with Cen-
tral Asia and the wider Caspian region and a safer 
transit route to China if  it does more to broker 
a deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict.
2. Germany should rethink its eastern policy and 
develop a two-track approach. On the one hand, 
relations with Russia are important and have to 
be deepened in the context of  EU-Russia rela-
tions with a modernization partnership, energy 
cooperation, and support of  good governance. 
On the other hand, Germany must develop a 
policy towards the post-Soviet space without 
Russia on bilateral and multilateral tracks. This 
approach is a precondition for a more suc-
cessful and strategic EU-policy in the South 
Caucasus. Russia should be involved in specific 
policy platforms and confidence-building mea-
sures, but simultaneously it should have no 
influence on German and EU decision-making 
concerning the post-Soviet space and the South 
Caucasus.
3. Germany should recalibrate its policy in the 
region by moving away from Georgia to a more 
balanced approach towards all three states of  
the region, lead by a closer partnership with 
Azerbaijan on energy, economic cooperation 
and development, and conflict resolution. This 
also means that Berlin should take a more pro-
active stance in bringing about a resolution to 
the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict, which 
is the main obstacle to regional cooperation and 
growth. Berlin should insist the EU take over 
from France the position of  the Co-Chair in the 
Minsk Group. With its role as one of  the main 
aid donors to Armenia, Berlin and the EU have 
the ability to influence Yerevan, and they can 
leverage on this influence.
4. In addition to promoting conflict resolution and 
working closely with Azerbaijan on developing 
the EU-Caspian energy links, Germany can also 
lead the EU in supporting further integration 
between the region and the EU. Furthermore, 
Germany should not abolishment the idea of  
offering this region a clear EU representative, 
even if  membership in the EU club may not 
be a realistic option for the South Caucasus 
countries.
5. Germany should actively support the South-
ern Energy Corridor project, which means 
increasing the level of  relations and interactions 
between Berlin and Baku and Berlin and Ash-
gabat. This support must include the Southern 
Energy Corridor and the Trans-Caspian pipeline 
system, and be based on sound economics and 
politics. Increasing the stability and diversity 
of  energy supplies to Europe is ultimately in 
the interest of  Germany, who with its massive 
economy can only benefit by an increase in the 
number of  routes and suppliers to Europe.
6. Berlin should increase its outreach to Turkey in 
order to better coordinate EU’s conflict resolu-
tion in the South Caucasus, and EU’s Caspian 
energy policy. Turkey is a key country shaping 
the trends in the South Caucasus, Black Sea, 
and the broader Caspian region. Concerning 
relations with Ankara, concentration on the 
discussion about Turkey’s potential EU mem-
bership hinders a broader cooperation with the 
country regarding energy and conflict resolu-
tion. Together with France, Germany still plays 
an inhibitory role in this discussion and must 
rethink its approach. The EU and its member 
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states should better calibrate its policy with 
Ankara and push the EU accession of  the coun-
try as an important strategic decision.
7. Without Russia a competitive EU-South Cauca-
sus policy is impossible, and Germany should 
convey this message in Brussels clearly. Moscow 
is a partner in the conflict resolution process 
in the South Caucasus, but cannot be allowed 
to inhibit promoting progress and change. This 
means that the EU will have to develop a South 
Caucasus policy independent of  Moscow, even 
if  closely coordinated with Moscow. Germany 
with its special relations should facilitate good 
cooperation with Russia in the region, but not 
sacrifice EU’s strategic interests for the sake 
of  maintaining a no-conflict relationship with 
Russia.
8. An indispensable partner for the EU in the 
region is also the US. Here too, the role of  Ber-
lin can be instrumental in terms of  leveraging 
its good relations with the US to bring Brus-
sels and Washington closer together in their 
policy approach towards the South Caucasus 
and the broader Caspian region. The Obama 
Administration’s less confrontational policy 
towards Russia and its special relations with 
Turkey offers a good basis for a more coordi-
nated approach between the EU and the US in 
managing transition in the South Caucasus. The 
EU and its member states have to be aware 
that the US does not have the same interests 
in the region, and that its current Russia policy 
is made with regard to other international 
crises. Europe should accept the reality of  a 
limited US involvement in the region in order 
to push its own agenda in coordination with 
Washington.
Dr. Stefan Meister, Program Officer Russia / Eurasia, 
Research Institute, DGAP e. V.
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